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Incentives, Information, and Organizational Design 
Joseph E. Stiglitz*) 
Most economic activity --  and almost all production --  takes place within the context of or- 
ganizations: Firms, family, and government. In each, there is a large element of collective 
decision-making. Our mixed attitudes towards this collective decision-making are reflected 
by a number of popular aphorisms and jokes: While we may claim that "two heads are bet- 
ter than one", it is also true that "too many cooks spoil the broth". "l'here is the old joke 
about an elephant being a horse made by a committee. 
The fact that we continue to make so many decisions collectively, that we so frequently as- 
sign difficu!t problems to committees, is suggestive that this form of decision-making must 
have some virtues, to compensate at least partially for its well recognized vices. 
For the past several years, I (together with my co-author, Raaj Sah of Yale University) have 
been engaged in a research programme attempting to understand better the behaviour of 
economic organizations(I). We have focused in particular on decision-making. Our concern 
has not only been with the structure of decision-making within organizations, such as firms, 
but more broadly, the organization of decision-making in society as a whole. 
The contrast between our perspective, and the standard description of "the economic 
problem" should be clear: We have been concerned not so much with the rules for allocat- 
ing resources (e. g., setting marginal rates of substitution equal to marginal rates of trans- 
formation) as with how decisions about resource allocations get made, who makes those 
decisions, and how those who make those decisions are selected. We are concerned, in a 
sense, with the process by which resources get allocated. 
There is a good reason that standard economic theory has paid little attention to these 
problems. In the standard formulation, there is a fixed set of resources (endowments), and 
fixed preferences; there is a once-and-for-all problem of allocating resources. Arrow and 
Debreu had the insight to see that, within that formulation, it made little difference whether 
there was a static, one-period resource allocation problem or a multi-period resource allo- 
cation problem. That result, in itself, should have alerted us that something was seriously 
flawed about the Walrasian perspective. (This is not to say that the Arrow-Debreu work has 
not been very useful, but, in retrospect, more in helping us to identify what is wrong with 
the standard competitive paradigm and in developing the market failures approach to gov- 
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ernment interventions, than in helping us to understand how resources are actually allo- 
cated in modern capitalist economies.) 
There is another result that should have had a similar effect: The Lange-Lemer-Taylor the- 
orem, asserting the equivalence of a market socialist economy and a capitalist economy. 
Given that the theorem was based on an inaccurate description of the market economy and 
an even worse description of socialist economies, it is not surprising that the result, sug- 
gesting an equivalence between the two, should seem so far off the mark. Yet that theorem 
has not been without influence, as several socialist economies have tried to approach mar- 
ket socialism. The problems encountered, say, by the Chinese even in their limited at- 
tempts to move in the direction of market socialism should make us cautious, not only 
about the policy relevance of the theory, but more fundamentally, about the adequacy of 
the theory itself(2). 
With there being only a once-and-for-all decision concerning the allocation of resources, no 
wonder that not much attention was paid to the process by which resources get allocated. 
Indeed, the question of who should be in decision-making roles --  a question that occu- 
pies much of the time of businessmen, and even academics - -  is of utterly no importance. 
The view of economics encapsulated in the Arrow-Debreu framework (and reflected in the 
contemporaneously written textbooks, such as Samuelson) is what I call "engineering 
economics" (although in doing so, I intend no slur on the engineering profession). It was, 
perhaps, most accurately put by Joan Robinson, when she described the job of the man- 
ager of a firm as looking up in the book of blueprints the correct page corresponding to 
current (and possibly future) factor markets. 
Even those much heralded results concerning the decentralizability of the economy were 
not so much results concerning the decentralization of decision-making --  for there was 
really little scope for decision-making within the Arrow-Debreu framework(3) - -  as they 
were descriptions of a computational algorithm. 
I cannot, within the confines of this lecture, develop fully the alternative approach that we 
have been exploring. My objective is more limited: First, to clarify.some of the important 
failures of the traditional competitive paradigm; secondly, to describe briefly some of the 
major ingredients in our alternative approach; and thirdly, to show how our approach yields 
new insights, both in the new questions which it raises and in the new answers to long 
standing questions which it provides. We focus our attention in Section 3 in particular on 
the role of time in resource allocation and on the choice of centralized versus decentralized 
resource allocation mechanisms(4). Among the questions about which our analysis will 
have something to say is: Why is it that, in spite of the praise that is traditionally heaped 
upon the price system --  and the abuse to which bureaucratic behaviour is subjected - -  in 
times of war almost all countries abandon reliance on the market and resort to some sys- 
tem of direct controls? This seems all the more curious, since it is precisely in times of war 
that resources need to be husbanded carefully. Moreover, our conventional textbook sto- 
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ries stress the role of prices in conveying information(5). When the market at one date 
looks much the same as on previous dates, there is little "news" to be conveyed. It is in 
times of change and massive resource reallocations --  such as associated with war --  
when we should have thought that the price system would show its mettle, its distinct ad- 
vantage (if indeed it has such an advantage) over other ways of conveying information. And 
yet this is precisely the time when country after country seems to lose its faith in the mar- 
ket. 
1. Some failures of the traditional paradigm 
There are several obvious --  but no less fundamental on that account --  criticisms of the 
traditional theory. I shall touch upon four in this lecture. 
1.1 The complexity of the commodity space 
The first has to do with the complexity of the commodity space. In the examples we teach 
our students, we talk ,about apples, oranges, and wheat. But any farmer can tell you that 
there is no such thing as a price for an apple. The price depends on the kind of apple, its 
freshness (and a variety of other quality characteristics), its location, and the time of the 
year. Industrial commodities are even more difficult, having a myriad of relevant attrib- 
utes(6). 
This has two fundamental implications. First, it makes it virtually impossible for a central 
planner (a Walrasian auctioneer) to set prices, or to set prices in a way which adequately 
reflects this diversity of characteristics, which results in products of the right characteris- 
tics being produced. Market socialist economies have learned the hard way what happens 
when the product is incompletely specified. If a price is specified for "nails" short nails 
made out of any cheap material will be produced. If the length is specified, the producer 
may still make nails out of a cheap material, which may be excessively brittle. For more 
complex commodities, almost no matter how many characteristics are specified, there re- 
main scope for discretion, and in particular, cost cutting which adversely affects how well 
the commodity performs the task for which it is intended. Moreover, it becomes extremely 
costly to provide complete specifications of very complex commodities (see Note 6). More- 
over, if all the inputs (materials, etc.) are fully specified --  for instance, the material of 
which the nail is to be composed - -  it forecloses opportunities for finding alternative mate- 
rials which meet the user's needs as well or better, but which are less expensive. If only the 
characteristics of the nail were specified (brittleness, hardness, etc.), it often becomes a 
matter of judgment about whether these standards have been met. And even then, there 
remain questions of trade-offs: Some material might exceed the original standard in some 
characteristic, and fall short in another. What price should the producer receive for such a 
commodity? Market socialism provides no answer --  other than requiring the planner to 
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provide a complete set O f prices (an impossible task). The market economy --  which is not 
a pure price system -- provides an answer, through the interaction of buyers and sellers in 
real markets, in which prices are negotiated, not taken as given. 
Secondly, it means that markets are frequently --  perhaps I should say usually - -  imper- 
fectly competitive. The products produced by one firm usually differ slightly, in one of the 
many characteristics, from those produced by others. 
The process of production is often more one of "negotiation" than of "price-taking". Firms 
negotiate delivery times, product characteristics, as well as price. Information (about the 
needs of the buyers, the technological capabilities of the sellers) is transmitted in the proc- 
ess. Prices play a vital role in this transmission. The qualitative statement, "it would be hard 
to make a nail which will do what you want it to do", becomes a quantitative statement, "1 
can do it, but the cost of the nail will be $1.23 per nail". There is competition: The buyer will 
check with other producers, to see if they can make a better offer. But it is not the kind of 
competition described by the Arrow-Debreu model. 
1.2 Technological change 
Nowhere are the failures of the traditional price-taking paradigm more apparent than in the 
analysis of technological change and of the allocation of time. I shall also have more to say 
about the allocation of time later in this lecture; here let me make a few comments about 
technological change. 
It is not only that the standard competitive model does not address the problems asso- 
ciated with technological change, and in particular the development of new products; but 
the framework of that model cannot be extended to incorporate technological change, at 
least in a meaningful way. How can a firm be a price taker for a commodity, which has yet to 
be invented? And to obtain a return on its R&D, firms must exercise at least some monop- 
oly power, as Schumpeter long ago emphasized. Moreover, the technical assumptions, 
such as convexity, underlying standard competitive analysis, are simply inappropriate when 
there is technological change(7). Many of the problems here are closely related to prob- 
lems that costly and imperfect information poses for the standard analysis of market econ- 
omies, to which I shall turn shortly(8). 
There are many important links between organizational design, incentives, and technologi- 
cal change --  issues which are not even addressed within the standard model. High rates 
of technological change require greater institutional adaptability, and a standard argument 
in favour of decentralized systems(9) is their greater adaptability. At the same time, decen- 
tralized structures provide both the competition which is a spur to innovation and the close 
interaction between producers and users which helps direct innovation in an effective man- 
ner(10). 
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1.3 Information and errors 
The third problem .with the standard paradigm I have already hinted at: It poses the re- 
source allocation problem as a once-and-for-all decision. In fact, new products, new infor- 
mation, new individuals are constantly entering the market. These events cannot be fully an- 
ticipated. As new events occur, new opportunities are opened up and new decisions have 
to be made. Different economic systems will differ in the speed with which they can re- 
spond to the new conditions and opportunities, and in how well they respond, including the 
errors that they make. 
Though it has long been recognized that "to err is human", until recently there have been 
few attempts to explore systematically the causes of human fallibility and its consequences 
for the design of organizations. In the Arrow-Debreu framework, individuals may have dif- 
fering subjective beliefs about the likelihood of different states, but there is no such thing 
as "right" or "wrong", no attempt to come to terms with the differences in judgments, no 
process by which views on the likelihood of different states would change. 
This is, of course, not the view taken by businessmen: They do not believe that one opinion 
is necessarily just as good as any other. Firms must decide how much and what informa- 
tion to gather, they must decide on how that information is to be gathered, e. g., to what 
extent the process of information gathering should be decentralized; and beyond that, they 
must decide who should gather the information and upon whose judgments they should 
rely. 
Inevitably, or at least with a high probability, there will be differences in views: Some will 
think the project worth undertaking, others that it will not be. Any organization has to have 
a way of resolving these differences, a way, in other words, of aggregating the beliefs of the 
different participants. 
In designing a structure (or as we called it in our earlier work, the architecture) of decision- 
making, account must be taken of two aspects of individuals and their relations with each 
other: 
1. individuals have a finite capacity. (I am particularly aware of this in observing others.) In 
particular, within any time they can collect only a limited amount of information. Time is of 
the essence in decision-making, partly because the relevant information is frequently 
dated: One typically can collect information about current relative prices, but only very 
limited information about future relative prices; information about relative prices can 
quickly become dated. 
Because of their limited capacities, individuals never have perfect information, and there- 
fore there is always a positive probability of an error of judgment. (Errors arise, of 
course, not only from the limited collection of information, but also from imperfect pro- 
cessing of the available information, again characteristics which most of us have become 
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accustomed to noticing in others, if not in ourselves.) The heuristics individuals use in 
making judgments, in arriving at conclusions from the available information, are particu- 
larly error prone when used in contexts which differ from those for which they were origi- 
nally developed; but judging whether one is in such a situation is itself a question in 
which opinions may differ, and in which errors frequently arise(11). 
2. Communication is limited and imperfect. An individual can seldom communicate all the 
information he has learned to another individual, and what he communicates is often 
transmitted with noise; errors enter in the transmission process(12). I cannot give you 
(to use the term of computerspecialists) a "dump" of what is in my brain. I always sense 
that my understanding of a subject is far better and more complete than what I can com- 
municate to you: You will only be able to know but a fraction of what (I believe) 1 know. 
Concentration of information gathering and decision-making in small groups saves on com- 
munication costs and reduces the problems arising from communication errors. But the fi- 
niteness of the capacities of individuals means that concentrating decision-making may re- 
sult in decisions based on more limited information, and hence more subject to errors (on 
that account). 
What is critical is not only the number of individuals involved in the decision-making proc- 
ess, but how they are arranged. In earlier studies, we contrasted the errors arising from 
hierarchical decision structures (in which, for instance, project approval required approval 
by all members of a hierarchical chain) with those arising from polyarchical decision struc- 
tures, in which any unit could approve the project on its own. (Our analysis of polyarchical 
structures was meant to be suggestive of market economies: In a market economy, any 
firm can undertake a project, and there are usually several firms in the same industry in- 
volved in reviewing similar kinds of projects.) In the simple models we examined, when the 
standards of acceptance of projects in both hierarchy and polyarchy are the same, so that 
the likelihood of any singl e individual (subunit of the organization) recommending that a 
good project be rejected or a bad project be accepted is the same in both organizational 
forms, hierarchical decision-making led to more good projects being rejected, but fewer 
bad projects being accepted. Both of these organizational forms could be viewed as spe- 
cial cases of committee structures, where the size of the committees and the degree of re- 
quired consensus depends on the costs of various kinds of errors as well as the likelihood 
that any single decision maker would make a particular error. We showed, for instance, that 
the more important he decision (that is, a decision where errors were more costly), the 
larger the size of the committee, explaining the sense of powerlessness often felt by indi- 
viduals in modern society: As individuals earn the right to participate in more important de- 
cisions, their voice becomes only one of an increasingly larger number responsible for 
making these decisions. 
Another critical aspect of the design of decision-making structures is delay. Hierarchical 
structures, because they require more approval, may be more subject to delay. Moreover, 
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the malfunction of any one part of the system may have severe consequences for the over- 
all performance of the organization, and, in particular, lead to long delays. 
Delay may be reduced by having a large number of individuals look at a project simultane- 
ously (but independently). But this has a distinct cost disadvantage over the sequential re- 
view process typically associated with hierarchical structures(13). 
The issues of organizational form and information (error) aggregation arise at all levels in 
society. We can think of the market economy as one large polyarchical organization, each 
of the units of which are themselves organizations, many of which are hierarchically organ- 
ized. Our earlier analyses provided some hints at the circumstances under which one or- 
ganizational form would be more desirable than another, and an explanation of why we 
should not be surprised to see the kind of mixture of polyarchy and hierarchy that in fact 
we observe(14). 
1.4 Incentives 
Perhaps the most widely recognized failure of the traditional competitive framework is its 
failure to give sufficient attention to the problem of incentives. Of course, in the obiter dicta 
surrounding the model, reference is frequently made to the incentives provided by compe- 
tition. But the incentive problems which the model addresses are not those which, again, 
most businessmen view themselves as facing. In the traditional model, workers do not have 
to be motivated: They either do the job which they have contracted to perform, or they do 
not get paid the contracted amount. The pay that they receive does provide them, to be 
sure, with an incentive to perform the job, provided it compensates them for the disutility of 
the task and the foregone leisure. 
But the incentive problem which firms face arises from the fact that few individuals are paid 
on a piece rate basis, on the basis of performance alone. (The reasons for this I discussed 
extensively in my 1975 paper.) 
This is particularly true of individuals involved in decision-making. After all, we have argued 
that most decision-making is done collectively. It is very difficult o assign responsibility for 
failures, or successes for that matter. And indeed, many, if not most individuals; go to great 
trouble to make it difficult o assign blame. They make sure that others have been appropri- 
ately consulted, and they are careful about what they put down on paper. Verbal communi- 
cation is much more subject to reinterpretation -- to claiming that, if one's advice turns out 
to be wrong, the advice was not correctly understood. When individuals put pen to paper, 
to leave, as the expression goes, a paper trail, they are careful that it reads like a Delphic 
oracle. 
In some sense, the Arrow-Debreu model not only does not address the central incentive is- 
sues facing the economy, it gives the wrong impression about the relationship between 
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competition (at least the peculiar form of competition which goes by the rubric of "perfect 
competition") and incentives. In the case of technological change, providing incentives re- 
quires that the individual be able to appropriate some part of the social returns to the inno- 
vation --  as the patent system does. But this in turn means that these markets cannot be 
perfectly competitive. Just as perfectly efficient capital markets would provide no incentive 
for individuals to acquire information (see Grossman - -  St ig l i tz ,  1976, 1980A), so perfectly 
competitive product markets would provide no incentives for innovation. 
But while the traditional model of the Arrow-Debreu economy does not pay proper due to 
the importance of incentives, the Lange-Lerner-Taylor view of market socialism is far 
worse: Managers are supposed to maximize firm profits, at the established prices, simply 
because it is their job to do so. Of course, fftheir job was as simplistic as it typically was 
depicted--  looking up the appropriate page in the book of blueprints --  incentives might 
indeed have been a second order issue. But if our view of the importance of decision-mak- 
ing is correct, then incentives are important. And incentives require both property rights 
and at least the possibility of inequality: For if individuals' standards of living are guaranteed 
to be essentially the same, regardless of whether one works hard or not, there is little in- 
centive to work hard. Incentive issues are concerned not just with effort, but also with risk- 
taking: So long as individuals do not bear all the consequences of the risks which their ac- 
tions can affect, there will be imperfect incentives. These incentive questions are not 
addressed by the Arrow-Debreu model because, by assumption, individuals do bear all the 
consequences of their actions. 
In recent years, there has been considerable research on the design of good incentive 
structures(15). These require balancing off, say, the gains from better incentives from rely- 
ing more extensively on piece rates or more generally performance related compensation 
schemes, versus the costs in terms of greater risk-bearing by the worker. 
One form of incentives which has received some attention is contests - -  a form of compe- 
tition much more akin to the kind of competition we see in everyday life than the perfect 
competition of the standard paradigm. Patent races are contests where the winner takes 
all, although the loser is often in a good position to compete in the next race. Markets can 
be viewed as contests, in which the losers - -  those who can't keep up with the rest - -  are 
eliminated(16). The essential nature of these contests is that compensation depends on 
re la t ive  performance(17). I now want to say a few words about the virtues of contests, and 
the concomitant organizational architectures. 
2. Contests and polyarchies 
In the preceding section, we argued that the view of competition reflected in the Arrow-De- 
breu model does not provide a good model of modern capitalism; it does not even address 
some of the central issues facing market economies. 
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Modern market economies are characterized by many firms producing many different pro d - 
ucts. There is competition and there is decentralization of decision-making. A major part Of 
my research programme over the past few years has been concerned with understanding 
better how competition and decentralized decision-making actually work in modern econ- 
omies. 
In our previous discussions, we have identified three tasks facing any organization: It must 
select those to be involved in decision-making (the se lect ion  problem); it must provide in- 
centives; and it must have a decision-making structure, a structure which balances off the 
various errors, which trades off the costs of errors and of delays with the costs and bene- 
fits of obtaining faster and more accurate decisions. 
In our work on decision-making structures, we identified some distinct advantages --  from 
the perspective of error aggregation --  of polyarchical structures. This was particularly true 
when the units of the polyarchy adjusted the standards for acceptance of a project to re- 
flect the limited number of reviews to which it was subjected. 
Polyarchical structures have two further distinct advantages: They provide a basis of com- 
parison of performance, which can be used for the design of effective incentive structures, 
and which can be used as the basis of selection. 
One of the problems facing standard piece rate systems is the determination of the appro- 
priate piece rate. In contexts where the environment is changing rapidly, where technology 
is evolving, and where opportunity costs may be varying, the appropriate piece rate must 
constantly be changing. (Of course, if there were a complete set of prices, the piece rate 
would simply need to adjust to reflect the price changes. But this brings us back to the first 
point made earlier - -  the complexity of the commodity space. There is not a complete set 
of prices; there are not prices for a car with four thousand seven hundred and eighty two 
screws tightened and for a car with four thousand, seven hundred and eighty three screws 
tightened. There is no market price to which we can look for the value added of tightening 
one screw. And since most production occurs within large firms, most of the value added 
by individuals - -  when it can be identified --  represents but one piece of the production of 
a marketed commodity.) 
In joint work with Barry Nalebuff (Na lebuf f  - -  Stiglitz, 1983A), we showed how contests 
have the advantage of what we called incent ive flexibil ity. It was as if the piece rate adjusted 
automatically to reflect the difficulty of the task. Consider a two-person contest. If the task 
became easier, if one kept his output target fixed, slacking off on effort, it would pay the 
other to increase his output target, to increase substantially the likelihood he would win. Of 
course, each participant knows this, and they all adjust their output targets to reflect the in- 
creased ease of the task. 
Market contests work in a similar way. One of the problems that monopolies face is the dif- 
ficulty of knowing whether they are producing efficiently. Of course, the standard theory 
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says that the problem with monopoly is only that it produces too little; whatever it produces 
it produces efficiently. But this does not seem to accord well with widespread perceptions 
of managerial slack in monopolies. The problem is that the owners --  or the government 
regulators, in the case of reguJated natural monopolies - -  do not know whether the man- 
agers are performing well; and the managers may not know whether their subordinates are 
performing well. How much should it cost to make a telephone call between New York and 
Chicago? How expensive Should it be to develop a less expensive way of transmitting infor- 
mation? The best, and in some cases, the only meaningful answers can be derived by com- 
parisons. But comparisons require several units undertaking similar tasks. 
For some tasks, even a monopoly can set up bases of comparisons: It can organize con- 
tests among telephone operators. Polyarchically organized decision-making provides a ba- 
sis of comparison of the competence of different decision-making units. Letting pay and 
selection for promotion depend on the comparative evaluations thus both provides incen- 
tives and facilitates the selection process. 
(Contests have other virtues, and some vices, which we briefly note. The incentives they 
provide are provided with limited risk-bearing on the part of the participants. Sometimes 
competition is less effective than we have depicted it - -  workers band together to limit the 
degree of competition among themselves, labelling those who work too hard, who play the 
game as management intended, as rate busters; and sometimes it may even be destructive 
- -  one can win not by doing well but by ensuring that one's rival does badly; competition 
among first-year law students, with pages being ripped out of the relevant law journals to 
hamper rivals, is clearly not constructive; and Salop (see, e. g., Salop - -  Scheffman,  1983) 
has shown a variety of circumstances in which, with imperfect competition, efforts are di- 
rected at raising rivals' costs rather than lowering one's own costs and he has shown a va- 
riety of ways in which firms can and do raise rivals' costs.) 
3. Time, incentives, and organizational design 
Many, if not most contests that we see in day-to-day life involve time: Both who can do the 
most (make the most widgets) within a given amount of time, and who can do a particular 
task (run a quarter mile, swim 100 meters) in the fastest time. 
Time is among our scarcest resources - -  our days on this earth are numbered - -  and while 
conventional economics has focused on how markets lead to efficient allocations of individ- 
uals' time between leisure and work, they have had little to say about many of the more in- 
teresting problems involving time. 
In this section, I present four examples in which time is of the essence, in which the stand- 
ard competitive models provide little if any insight into what is going on, but in which our 
alternative approach provides several insights. The examples illustrate the ways in which 
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markets - -  and time --  address the fundamental problems of incentives, selection, and de- 
cision-making. 
The first example focuses on incentives, and addresses the question, does the market pro- 
vide appropriate incentives for R&D? Is the pace of research too fast or too slow? 
The second example focuses on selection, and addresses the question, does the market 
ensure that the least-cost producers actually produce? We construct a simple model show- 
ing how time helps solve this problem: In equilibrium lower-cost firms enter markets, on av- 
erage, at a more rapid rate. But the market's screening is far from perfect: There is some 
chance that high-cost firms enter even when there are lower-cost firms around. And the 
market's selection mechanism is far from costless: There is some chance that two firms 
will enter, even when economic efficiency entails only one firm. 
While problems of coordination arise in our second example, issues of coordination and 
communication are central to our third and fourth examples. In our third example, we show 
how judgments about the worth of a project made in a decentralized economy are commu- 
nicated indirectly, and not just by prices, but also by "time": The fact that no one else has 
undertaken a project conveys important information to any firm or individual contemplating 
undertaking it. This information affects the decision rules employed. As we shall see, our 
analysis provides an interesting interpretation of the oft noted observation that firms claim 
that they require high rates of return in order to undertake a project (after tax returns in the 
order of 15 percent to 25 percent), far higher than the realized ex-post returns. 
The fourth example attempts to provide an answer to one of the questions we posed in the 
introduction: Why is it that in times of war so many countries abandon the use of the mar- 
ket? 
3.1 Patent races: An example of a game of timing 
Imagine how an Arrow-Debreu model, with a complete set of markets, might deal with the 
question, do market economies provide the correct incentives concerning the speed of 
R&D? Let me simplify the problem for the moment by ignoring risk. First, there would have 
to exist prices for commodities which have not yet been invented, perhaps not yet even 
conceived. (That, I admit, is a mind-boggling thought.) The commodities would have to be 
fully described, with a complete list of all their characteristics. (That, again, is a mind-bog- 
gling thought.) Next, these prices would have to be defined for each moment of time, that 
is, there would have to exist prices at all dates, so that the potential producer would know 
the extra returns to be obtained from inventing the invention a day earlier. Finally, each of 
these markets would have to be fully competitive: There would have to be many producers 
standing ready to produce at each date, to produce a commodity which has not yet been 
invented !
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I present this example in some detail, lest there be any among you who have any lingering 
doubts about the applicability of the Arrow-Debreu paradigm to industrial economies in 
which technological change is important. 
The returns to innovation are, as Schumpeter long ago recognized, the rents associated 
with monopoly or oligopoly. The question is, does the race to acquire these rents lead to 
too fast or too slow research? The answer to this question reflects the old joke about eco- 
nomics exams: The questions stay the same, only the answers change. Arrow (1962) sug- 
gested that, because in competitive markets, inventors do not capture the consumer sur- 
plus associated' with the lower prices resulting from innovation, there will be too little 
innovation; and that with monopoly, this problem is exacerbated, because with monopoly 
output is lower (than under competition), and therefore the appropriable benefits from cost 
reductions (the change in costs times the quantity produced) is,smaller than under compe- 
tition. Stigtitz (1971), Barzel (1968), and Dasgupta - -  Stiglitz (1980A) then showed that 
there might be excessive expenditures on R&D. Their results can be seen as an early ver- 
sion of the by now common argument hat in economies with rents, there will be excessive 
expenditures on rent seeking activity. The return to a patent is a rent. The race to get that 
rent will dissipate much of the value of the rent. 
In the case of a patent race with an incumbent monopolist, Dasgupta and Stiglitz showed 
that not all rents would be dissipated: The incumbent would spend resources just to the 
point where it would not pay a rival to enter; the rival's potential profit, entering as a duopo- 
list, must be zero, leaving a strictly positive profit for the incumbent monopolist(18). 
But upon closer examination, this result in turn had to be qualified: In these earlier studies, 
decisions about R&D expenditures were once-and-for-all decisions, not made sequentially. 
Most races --  including patent races - -  are appropriately modelled as entailing sequential 
decision-making. The participants look at their position, relative to rivals, to decide on how 
much resources to devote the next period to the race, or whether to drop out. Expendi- 
tures on R&D are, for the most part, sunk costs. One of the more important results to 
emerge from the recent research in industrial structure is the recognition of the importance 
of sunk costs; with sunk costs potential competition does not suffice, either to ensure 
economic efficiency or competitive outcomes (zero profits; see Stiglitz, 1988). An incum- 
bent monopolist can position itself so that it can meet challenges from rivals: If it does this, 
they will have no incentive to enter an R&D contest. And if it is successful, the pace of inno- 
vation will - -  apart from an initial expenditure to put itself in the appropriate position to 
meet these challenges - -  be determined essentially as if it were a protected monopoly. Ar- 
row's original conclusion, that markets may provide too little incentives for R&D, is re- 
stored, under more general conditions (for, unlike Arrow, we allow the presence of poten- 
tial competitors), but for quite different reasons(19). 
I present this example in some detail both because of its importance for understanding 
market economies and as an illustration of the general principle, upon which I now wish to 
expand, that market economies often do not deal well with time. 
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3.2 Entry races: A second example of a game of timing 
In older (pre-Arrow-Debreu) discussions of the virtues and vices of capitalist economies, 
one criticism of capitalist economies that was often raised related to their inability to coor- 
dinate investment, and in particular, entry, decisions. If people believed that there was an 
increase in the demand for pizza, there might be a rush of entry into pizza parlors, resulting 
in excess expenditures and social waste. The Arrow-Debreu model made clear the nature 
of the market failure: There were not equilibrium prices extending even slightly into the fu- 
ture for most commodities, and hence investors had to form expectat ions  of future prices. 
There was no coordinating mechanism to ensure that the appropriate amount of invest- 
ment would be undertaken. In the early sixties, some economists and the governments that 
they advised were hopeful that indicative planning would provide that coordinating mecha- 
nism, but the failure of the French experiment(20) has, for the most part, dashed those 
hopes. The lack of attention to this problem in recent years is not because it has disap- 
peared, but arises from the absence of any apparent solution, and the recognition of the 
marked disadvantages of alternative approaches involving larger governmental roles in co- 
ordination. 
In this section, I want to argue that decentralized decision-making concerning entry (or to 
use the term I used early, polyarchy) has both distinct advantages and problems, both of 
which have received insufficient attention to date. 
First, it may partially resolve the selection problem, to which I referred earlier: If there are 
several potential entrants, which should enter the market? Obviously, if we had a Walrasian 
auctioneer, the market price would serve to sort among the potential entrants; the firm(s) 
with the lowest costs would enter. But there is no Walrasian auctioneer. 
Similarly, one might imagine a Central Planner, asking each of the'potential producers to 
submit cost estimates, and on the basis of that deciding who should enter. But is there any 
reason to expect each to submit truthful estimates, or to engage in the requisite research 
to determine its costs accurately? 
The market provides a solution, but not without a cost. Assume that there are fixed, sunk 
costs of entry S, and that marginal costs are constant, but may either be low, C L , or high, 
Cz~. Assume there are two potential entrants. Each knows its own costs, but not its ri- 
vals'. 
With perfect information, the equilibrium would be easy to describe. There are three pos- 
sible cases --  both firms have low costs, both have high costs, or one has low costs, the 
other high costs. In the last case, the low-cost firm enters, the high-cost firm does not. In 
the other cases, one of the two firms enters (which one makes no difference), the other 
does not. For both firms to enter entails excessive expenditures on entry costs. 
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Equilibrium with imperfect information is markedly different. We assume that when both 
firms enter, prices are determined in a Bertrand game, that is, the price equals Ca if both 
are high-cost producers, CL if both are low-cost producers, and Czz--s if one is high-cost 
and the other low-cost. If a firm has a low cost, it enters with probability ar~. L,  if it hasa 
high cost, it enters with probability ~1. z4 9 If at date t, it observes no one has entered the 
previous period, it enters with probability ~t,  i 9 If a low-cost firm enters, it charges price qL, 
while if a high-cost firm enters, it charges price qH 9 If a low-cost firm observes that his rival 
has entered and is charging a price qH, he enters the next period. In this general structure, 
information is conveyed both by prices and by actions - -  or more accurately, inaction: The 
failure of one firm to enter leads the other firm to revise his estimate of whether the firm is a 
high- or low-cost firm; if the firm fails to enter, it appears more likely that the firm is a high- 
cost firm. This information obviously affects entry decisions. 
We do not propose to provide a general solution to this problem, but rather to illustrate the 
general principles in a two-period simplified version. For simplicity, we assume the parame- 
ters of the problem are such that st1, L = 1, and the qi is the monopoly price for firm of type 
i. Furthermore, we assume that there are only two periods and that the probability of hav- 
ing a high cost is 0.5. Then, the high-cost firm must be indifferent whether to enter the first 
period or not. There is a fifty-fifty chance his rival will have a high cost, and if he has a high 
cost, the probability he enters is ~rl (without confusion, we can drop the second sub- 
script). The possible outcomes are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 
High-cost firm enters 
Outcome Probability Period 1 Period 2 
Rival is low-cost 0.5 0 0 
Rival is high-cost and enters 0.5 ~rl 0 0 
Rival is high-cost and does not enter 0.5 (1 - -  Y / l )  R R 
R is the monopoly profits of the high-cost firm. Thus his expected profits are (ignoring discounting) 
2 x 0 .5 (1 - -~1)R- -S  
and this must equal zero, i. e., 
1 - -  ,.~1 = S / R  
or  
,7'~ 1 = 1 - -  S/R .  
When both have high costs, there is a chance = (1--~rl)2) that neither will enter in the first 
period. Then there is again a mixed strategy equilibrium the second period. By the same 
reasoning, ~2 is such that each firm is indifferent as to entering, i. e., since he only earns a 
return when the other firm does not enter: 
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R(1 - -~2)  = S, 
~2 = 1 - -  S/R .  
We now see the differences between the decentralized solution and the solution with per- 
fect information: 
1. One firm low-cost, one firm high-cost: 
A fraction of the time, ~1 , the high-cost firm enters; resources equal to S are wasted. 
2. Both firms low-cost: 
Always excessive entry, with resources S wasted. 
3. Both firms high-cost: 
A fraction of the time (1 - -  r ~ (1 - -  ,.r 2 no one enters. 
A fraction of the time (1 - -  ~1)2 (2 Y~'2 - -  ~b '2  2 )  entry is delayed. 
A fraction of the time ~12 + (1 - -~r l )  2~22 both firms enter, and resources S are 
wasted. 
Delay is serving as a partial screening device(21). Entry is not random. But there is a cost 
to the screening. We could contrast this decentralized screening mechanism with that of a 
bureaucratic system, which chooses one firm to enter. At the extreme, one could imagine 
the bureaucracy as simply randomly choosing one firm to enter. Then there would never be 
delay, there would never be duplication, but a fraction of the time - -  0.5 in our example - -  
the high-cost firm would be chosen. Relative to perfect information, both systems make 
mistakes. Which system is more efficient - -  that is, which mistakes are more costly - -  de- 
pends on the parameters o:f the problem. The inefficiency of the bureaucratic system de- 
pends on C~--  CL, the difference in costs. The inefficiency of the market system depends 
on three parameters: 1. the costs of duplication (essentially the magnitude of the sunk 
costs), 2. the costs of delay (the loss of consumer surplus when no entry occurs the first 
period, or the first and second period), and 3. the likelihood of duplication and delay, which 
depends critically on S/R,  sunk costs relative to profits. When S/R  is high, delay (no en- 
try) is more likely; when S IR  is small, duplication is more likely(22). 
This result may provide a partial answer to the question of why, in times of war, economies 
so often resort to bureaucratic selection: Delay may be particularly costly. Moreover, in the 
short run, the selection problem is not as severe as in the long run. If a market economy 
does a reasonably good job in screening out bad firms (high-cost producers), then as the 
economy enters an emergency, it begins with a better than random sample of firms from 
which to choose to make production decisions. Organizations change, and individuals en- 
ter and leave, so that the task of screening is a perpetual one. For a while, the economy can 
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slide along, taking advantage of the screening that occurred prior to the emergency. But 
over time, the value of this prior screening declines, and accordingly the costs of the failure 
to screen effectively increase. This is undoubtedly part of the reason why the longer market 
processes are suspended in an emergency, the more likely it is that the economy will en- 
counter increasing difficulties(23). 
3.3 Markets as aggregators of information 
Earlier, we identified three problems that all economic organizations must addre'ss: Selec- 
tion, information transmission and aggregation, and incentives. The previous example illus- 
trated how time (delay) could be used as a selection device. My next example illustrates 
how, in market contexts, time (delay) can be used as a way of transmitting and aggregating 
information. In earlier work with Sanford Grossman (Grossman - -  Stiglitz, 1976, 1980B) we 
showed how the price system conveyed and aggregated information. We are concerned 
here with a context in which the price system, by itself, effectively does neither. 
Consider the simplest decision-making problem: An organization must decide whether the 
expected return to a project is positive or negative. Each individual (subunit) within the or- 
ganization evaluates the project, but with error. There are three types of projects, very 
good projects (denoted with a subscript 0), mediocre (denoted with subscript 1), and bad 
(denoted with subscript 2). Evaluations are far from perfect. The probability that a project of 
type i will be evaluated as one of type j is denoted by Pij 9 if different individuals are as- 
signed the task of evaluating the project, there is some probability that their evaluations will 
differ. The question of information aggregation is, what to do in these circumstances. How 
are the conflicting reports to be brought together to make an organizational decision? 
In a market context, firms face the following quandary. If they think a project is good, it is 
likely that some other firm will think similarly --  if it is a good project. And if others think it is 
a good idea, then they are likely to enter, driving down the return. If the firm thinks the proj- 
ect is good (because it has erroneously evaluated it) and others think it bad, then it will be 
the only firm in the market - -  but because the project is not a good one, again returns are 
low. This is the same kind of logic that appears in auction markets, under the guise of the 
"winner's curse". In that context, it has been recognized that firms realize that there is in- 
formation in the others' bids; that when the individual wins, it means the others have bid 
lower, and that in turn means that their information about the project is not as positive as 
the winner's information. Taking this into acceunt, the winner bids a lower amount. 
One can view the decision to enter the market as a "bid". A firm takes into account the fact 
that when it is the only firm to enter, it is likely that its information is overly optimistic con- 
cerning the project's returns. This provides an explanation of the commonly observed puz- 
zle that firms insiston returns of 15 percent to 25 percent before undertaking projects, yet 
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ex-post realized returns average perhaps half that. Firms know that if they are to realize a 
12 percent return, their information must indicate a far higher return. 
These are examples of how non-price information --  other firms' decisions not to enter a 
market --  is taken into account in firm decision-making. The decision of the firm does re- 
flect some of the information gathered by other firms, 
I now want to draw attention to what might seem a perverse possibility: That in fact the 
best projects may not be undertaken as quickly as mediocre projects (and this is not be- 
cause, as we academics sometimes feel, our best ideas, being the most novel, are hardest 
for others to grasp, while our more mediocre colleagues, with their more simplistic ideas, 
find it easier to sell their ideas). The reason for this has to do with the absence of a coordi- 
nation mechanism: We know that if the project is really very good, it is likely that some 
other firm will think so too, and there is therefore a reasonable chance that both of us will 
enter, driving down the returns. The fear of excess entry for very good projects leads, on 
average, to delays in these projects being undertaken. 
To see this most dramatically, assume projects, regardless of their quality, have the same 
fixed, sunk costs, S. To simplify the calculations, we assume that very good projects are 
either evaluated as very good, or as bad, and mediocre projects are either evaluated as me- 
diocre or as bad. (It is straightforward but tedious to extend the analysis to the more gen- 
eral case.) Let P0 denote the probability that a very good project will be evaluated as good, 
and Pl the probability that a mediocre project will be judged to be mediocre. Firms are, of 
course, on the look-out not for the mediocre projects, but for the very good ones; the dis- 
covery of a mediocre project can be viewed as the unsuccessful outcome of a search for a 
very good project. Assume that (individuals believe that) more firms will be engaged in eval- 
uating any particular very good project than in evaluating any particular mediocre project. 
(There are, of course, more mediocre projects around.) For simplicity we ignore here the 
costs of evaluation. 
The return to a very good project, if only one firm undertakes it, is ~ ,  and the return to a 
mediocre project (if only one firm undertakes it) is R1 . When more than one firm under- 
takes a project, competition is sufficiently fierce that profits are driven to zero. If Ri is large 
relative to S, then equilibrium will be characterized by a mixed strategy: Only some of the 
time when a firm discovers a very good project or a mediocre project will it undertake it. 
(Firms may, of course, not view themselves as throwing dice to determine their mixed 
strategy; they may make judgments about the likelihood of other rivals entering, they may 
look at business forecasts or sunspots, or engage in other forms of "reasoning", the net ef- 
fect of which is simply to randomize their decisions.) 
Mixed strategies mean that a firm that observes a good or mediocre signal must be indiffer- 
ent to undertaking and not undertaking the project. We focus on-symmetric equilibria in 
which firms act as if they knew the number of other firms that have evaluated a project as 
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being good (mediocre). The analysis can easily be extended to the case where that number 
is viewed as a random variable. If eri is the probability that a firm that believes that his proj- 
ect is of type i undertakes it, and if ni is the number of firms that have evaluated a particular 
project of type i as being good, then 
R i X (1 - -  ~ ' i )  h i - -1 = S .  
Return Probability 
if the firm is that no other 
the only firm firm enters 
to undertake 
the project 
The probability that a project gets undertaken is 
G = 1 - -  (1 - -  ~ri) ni = 1 - -  (S /R i )  . i/(. i-1) 
To simplify matters, let us assume that n is just a function of R, the expected return to the 
project. For instance, if there are M firms evaluating the same portfolio of projects, then 
the expected number of firms giving a favourabie review to a project with return R is 
(1) n (R)  = p(R)M,  
p (R) is what we called in our earlier work the screening function," it has the property that 
p' > 0, projects with a higher expected return are more likely to get a favourable approval. 
Differentiating G with respect to R, we obtain 
[( 1)2  dn ~ ] 
dG = (1 - -  G) In(S/R) + /R  > or <0 
dR ~ ~ 
as  
d lnn  n - -1  
- - < o r > - -  
d In R In (R /S )  ' 
or, if n is simply related to R through the screening function, as described by equation (1) 
p 'R< or > n - -1  
p In (R /S )  " 
Thus, provided that the probability of getting a favourable evaluation goes up fast enough 
with the quality of the project (its expected return), the probability that a very good project 
will be undertaken in any period wilt actually decrease with its quality. 
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Of course, even if the probability that a project is undertaken does not decrease, the prob- 
ability that a project will be undertaken, given that it has had a favourable review, will de- 
crease with the quality of the project under somewhat less stringent conditions; that is 
d~ rln (S/R) dn 1 ] 
dR = (1 - - r  [ -~=i?dR+~/R < or >0 
as  
d lnn  n - -1  
- - > o r <  
d In R n In (S /R)  ' 
or, if n is simply related to R through the screening function, as 
p '  R > or < n - -  1 
p n In (S /R)  " 
3.4 Bureaucratic delay and organizational form 
There is a commonly held view that democracies - -  and polyarchical organizations - -  are 
fine if you can afford them; but when things must get done quickly, as in a time of war or in 
a country engaged in rapid development, more centralized control is called for. It is cer- 
tainly the case that most countries, in times of war, do resort to more centralization of con- 
trol, but whether this is because centralization is more efficient in making quick decisions, 
or because there is a mistaken belief in the efficacy of centralized control(24) - -  there is 
perhaps a false sense of security in such times from knowing that someone is in control - -  
has remained a question about which political scientists and historians have commented 
but which has received scant theoretical attention from economists. 
The proclivity to resort to centralized control seems particularly odd, given the widespread 
perception, at other times, that government bureaucracies are subject to delays and ineffi- 
ciencies. Why should an organizational form which is so abused in normal times suddenly 
change its stripes? 
I want to argue that in fact there may be some theoretical justification for the standard per- 
ceptions. First, however, we need to observe that time, that scarcest of commodities, is 
frequently not well allocated in organizations. 
This should not be surprising: The kinds of prices that are used to allocate scarce re- 
sources simply do not exist for the allocation of time within an organization. I once pro- 
posed to my department chairman that each chairman of a committee or department within 
the University be given a time budget, as well as a dollar budget. He could call a meeting, 
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but he would be charged for the time of the faculty members. I proposed, too, that a clock 
be placed on the wall, with the units being dollars, rather than minutes, so that each faculty 
member should weigh whether, for instance, his five minute speech was worth the $1,000 
of aggregate faculty time that it used. Needless to say, my suggestions were not taken up. 
Hannaway (1989), in her recent study of the behaviour of managers of administrative units 
of organizations, has emphasized the disparity between organizational objectives and indi- 
vidual objectives, and the difficulty of distinguishing between them. When one manager 
consults another, it may be to obtain better information or to check on the correctness of 
his calculations, actions which improve the decision. But it may also be to show the other 
how well informed he is, or to shift some of the risk --  should the decision turn out to be 
faulty --  onto others, actions the return to which may be more private than organizational. 
Since others' time is an unpriced resource, there is a natural tendency for an excessive 
amount of consultation. In her studies, the amount of time spent by managers in meetings 
was enormous - -  on average almost two-thirds of the time(25). 
We argued earlier that some degree of consultation, of collective decision-making, was an 
inevitable consequence of the limitations on any individual's ability to collect and process 
information. For most difficult decisions, two heads are better - -  but costlier - -  than one. 
The question is, how are the heads to be arranged? 
In our earlier work, focusing on polyarchical versus hierarchical decision-making, we made 
onty limited reference to the issue of the speed of decision-making Two observations were 
made: 1. sequential decision-making, while saving on the costs of decision makers, in- 
volved delays, and 2. hierarchical decision-making was more vulnerable to delays from 
"faulty parts", that is, from a weak link in the chain of command; for instance, in a hierarchi- 
cal structure, if one member of the hierarchy has an in-basket from which papers did not 
flow out, or came out only with long delays, the organization's performance could be seri- 
ously impaired. 
Here, I want to emphasize the costs and benefits of coordination in decision-making. We 
consider a set of projects requiring two pieces of information, which, because of disecon- 
omies of scope, must be collected by two separate individuals (suborganizations). The in- 
formation may take either one, two, or three periods to collect. At time 0, the individual as- 
signed to collect the information finds out how long it will take to collect his information. 
The organization cannot tell how long it should have taken to collect the information. As- 
sume that if information is not collected immediately prior to being used, it becomes obso- 
lete, and an additional expenditure is required to update it. Accordingly, if each believes 
that the other will complete the information acquisition in period 3, he will time his comple- 
tion for period 3(26). 
Consider now the gain from having an information coordinator-monitor, who, at time 0, de- 
termines how long it should take for the acquisition of each of the two pieces of informa- 
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tion. If Yi is the fraction of the time that it takes i periods to gather the information, there is 
a probability Yl 2 that the information will be processed at the end of period 1 and a proba- 
bility of (1--y32--yl 2) that it will be processed at the end of period 2. Let D~ represent the 
value of having a decision one period earlier, D2 the value of having a decision two periods 
earlier. Then the total (gross) value of the information coordination is represented by 
V= D1 (1 - -  y32--  yl 2) + D2 yl 2. 
We will now consider what happens as uncertainty about the time it takes to make a deci- 
sion becomes greater, i. e., we consider a mean preserving spread in the distributions of y. 
Hence, we assume that 
k = 21 + 2y2 + 37'3 = 2 - -y l  + 7'3 = mean time. 
Substituting, we obtain 
V= D1 [1 - - (k - -2 )2 - -2y12- -2 (k - -2 )y l ]  + D2 Z~ 2. 
If the distribution is symmetric, k=2.  It immediately follows that 
1. If the distribution of decision times is not too asymmetric, then a mean preserving in- 
crease in the uncertainty associated with information times increases the value of infor- 
mation coordination if D2 > 2 D; and 
2. An increase in the value of having information earlier increases the value of information 
coordination. 
In war time situations, the economy faces a whole range of distinctly new decision prob- 
lems. The range of times required to make decisions is increased. At the same time, the 
value of quick decision-making is increased enormously. Our theorem provides a rationale 
for greater centralized control of decision-making in such situations. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The Walrasian paradigm of the market economy --  and the Arrow-Debreu model to which it 
has given rise --  while it has provided fundamental insights into the role of the price sys- 
tem in coordinating certain economic decisions, is incomplete and misleading, both with re- 
spect to its view of the nature of competition and decentralization, the efficiency of the 
economy, and the importance of prices. Much of economic activity takes place within or- 
ganizations, in which limited use is made of the price system. We have seen how competi- 
tion --  contests - -  takes on a much richer dimension than reflected by the price-taking 
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paradigm. Firms compete for new innovations, and they race to enter markets. Individuals 
compete for positions within organizations. We have also seen how there is much more to 
decentralization than its role as a computing algorithm, as suggested by the conventional 
paradigm. Finally, while the traditional model exaggerates the virtues of the market - -  as 
Greenwald  - -  S t ig l i t z  (1986) have recently shown, whenever markets are incomplete and 
information is imperfect, market, allocations are almost never constrained Pareto efficient 
- -  it also understates its virtues: Its ability to solve, if necessarily imperfectly, the problems 
of selection, incentives, and information gathering and aggregation which are the core 
problems in organizational design. 
Few questions touch us as much in our everyday life as those concerning organizational 
design, or what we have called, organizational architecture. The sense of control over our 
own lives, our ability to fulfill ourselves as individuals, our sense of individuality may all de- 
pend, in large measure, on the extent of centralization or decentralization in our society. 
There is undoubtedly a relationship between economic decentralization and political 
democracy and freedoms. I have not touched upon these issues, not because I believe 
they are unimportant. But before we can address these broader issues, we must more fully 
understand the economic  strengths and weakness of decentralized market economies, 
looked at not through the rose tinted glasses of the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare 
Economics, but through the kind of more balanced perspective that I have tried to present 
to you today(27). 
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6. Notes 
(1) Reports on some of our results are presented in Sah - -  St igl i tz (1985A, 1985B, 1986, 1988A, 
1988B) and Stigl i tz (1987B). 
(2) In later sections of the paper, I shall touch on some of the problems that have been encountered in 
implementing market socialism, and I shall be more precise in what ways the Arrow-Debreu model 
does not provide a good description of how market economies function. 
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(3) in the Arrow-Debreu model, firms make cho ices  under uncertainty, but those choices are no differ- 
ent from conventional static choices: They simply maximize the value of the firm, using state contin- 
gent prices. They do not have to form judgments concerning the likelihood of various contingencies, 
and they are precluded, by assumption, from gathering information. There is no exploration of new 
technological possibilities, and no new products, and hence no scope for judgment concerning how 
the market would react to these new possibilities. 
A corollary of these characteristics is that there is always unanimity about what the firm should do. In 
practice, of course, there are often disagreements among managers about the firm's business strategy 
(see St ig l i tz ,  1970, and Grossman - -  St ig l i tz ,  1977, 1980A). 
(4) The new analytic results in this paper are contained in this section. 
(5) Though not our formal models. It was not until the recent development of information economics 
that formal models showing how new information affected prices, and how prices could serve to trans- 
mit or aggregate information, were developed (see Grossman - -  St ig l i tz ,  1976, 1980B). These models 
have quite different welfare properties from the standard Arrow-Debreu model. 
(6) An example of the complexity of the product space was recently provided by the U. S. Defense De- 
partment, when it put up for bidding a standard, white T-shirt, the kind of commodity that can be pur- 
chased in any clothing store for a few dollars. The specifications were 30 small print pages. 
(7) For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see St ig l i t z  (1987A). 
(8) Indeed, a central part of technological change is the acquisition of information (knowledge), and ac- 
cordingly, it is not surprising that all the problems that have been encountered in extending the stand- 
ard competitive paradigm to situations where information is imperfect arise when considering techno- 
logical change. 
(9) Not the stylized decentralization of the Arrow-Debreu model, but the kind of decentralization that 
actually characterizes market economies; see the preceding section. 
(10) These arguments suggest the possibility of multiple equilibria: Decentralized structures create an 
environment which contributes to their own relative advantage, and conversely with bureaucratic struc- 
tures. For an elaboration of this idea, see Sah - -  S t ig l i t z  (1989). 
(11) The work of Tversky and his co-authors has been particularly insightful in this respect. 
(12) The noisiness of communication is often illustrated by the children's game, in which people sit in a 
circle, and a message is passed quickly around. Usually, the version which returns to the originator of 
the message is highly garbled. 
(13) Thus, the essential difference between a committee of two, in which unanimity is required to pro- 
ceed with the project, and a hierarchy, is one of delay and wasted effort. The advantage of the hier- 
archy is that projects that have been rejected by one person are not reviewed bythe  other - -  and 
since both would have to agree to have the project adopted, such a review would have been wasted 
effort. On the other hand, in a committee structure (as we model it) the two reviews occur at the same 
time, while in the hierarchy, the second review does not begin until after the first is completed. 
(14) For instance, we show that 1. it is always desirable to break up a very long hierarchical chain into 
two (or more) hierarchies, with the hierarchies being sub-units of a polyarchy; 2. it is always desirable 
to reorganize a very wide polyarchy (that is, one in which there are many independent decision units), 
into two sub-units, which bear a hierarchical relationship with one another; and 3. with the appropriate 
combination of hierarchies and polyarchies, one can attain perfect discrimination between good and 
bad projects (see Sah - -  St ig l i tz ,  1986). 
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(15) See, for instance, Ross (1973) or Stiglitz (1974). 
(16) In on-going work, we have viewed the evolutionary process from this perspective, Two kinds of er- 
rors arise: Good organizations get eliminated, and bad organizations survive. We analyse the determi- 
nants of the relative frequency and costs of these two kinds of errors (see Sah - -  Stiglitz, 1985A). 
(17) Contributors to this recent literature include Lazear - -  Rosen (1981), Nalebuff - -  Stiglitz (1983A, 
1983B), Green - -  Stokey (1983), Holmstrom (1982), and Stiglitz (1986). 
(18) See also Gilbert - -  Newbery (1982), who extended the analysis to the case of uncertainty. 
Stiglitz (1986) went on to show several other problems with Arrow's original argument: While it is true 
that if all industries except one are competitive, then production in the one remaining industry will be 
less than it otherwise would be, it is not necessarily true that if all industries are imperfectly competi- 
tive, production in each is less than in the competitive equilibrium. Furthermore, the relevant second- 
best comparisons must take into account the actual level of production (given that production is re- 
stricted, the question is, is R&D too slow in monopolistic economies?) and alternative ways of raising 
revenues (benefit taxes used to finance R&D would, for instance, have much the same effect on out- 
put as monopoly). Finally, as Dasgupta - -  Stiglitz (1980A, 1980B) emphasized, market structure - -  the 
extent of competition - -  should itself be viewed as endogenous, depending, among other things, on 
the technology of technological change. 
(19) There are two other arguments suggesting that R&D may be too slow: Usually there are inappro- 
priable benefits from R&D (the results suggest ideas to others, ideas which have market value but can- 
not be patented). Indeed, in some cases, imitators have an advantage over innovators. There is a "sec- 
ond mover advantage". Not only does the imitator save on the initial R&D expenditures, and avoids the 
many unsuccessful projects, but he can also learn from the innovator. He can see, for instance, market 
reaction to the various attributes of the product introduced by the innovator, and design a better prod- 
uct. Though the innovator could, in principle, redesign his product, it is often more difficult to change a 
reputation, a market image, than to create a new one. 
(20) Partly due to the difficulties of getting the participants to reveal truthfully their investment plans, 
partly due to the problems we noted earlier arising from the complexity of the commodity space. 
(21) Bolton - -  Farre# (1988) have recently formulated a model in which the date of entry --  the delay 
from the first possible time for entry - -  serves as a perfect screening device; the lowest-cost firm and 
only the lowest-cost firm enters. The cost of this increased accuracy of screening (and reduced dupli- 
cation) is increased delay. 
(22) The expected loss of the bureaucratic selection mechanism (relative to first-best, perfect informa- 
tion) is approximately 0.25 [(CH - -  CL) QH + DWL (Cz~ - -  Cz.)], where Qfl  is the output with costs 
equal to CE and DWL (C f l - -  CL) is the dead-weight loss (the Harberger triangle) arising from the cur- 
tailment of production associated with using the high-cost technology. 
The expected loss from the market mechanism can be decomposed into three parts. When there is 
one low-cost firm and one high-cost firm (which occurs with probability 0.5), expected losses are 
( l - - s )  S, where s~ S IR .  When there are two lost-cost firms (which occurs with probability 0.25), the 
loss is S. And when both firms are high-cost, there are three kinds of losses: With probability s 4 no 
one enters, and in that case the (present discounted-value) loss is Z (1 + 0), where Z is the total sur- 
plus from producing (when C= C~) the first period, and ~ Z is the surplus from producing the sec- 
ond; with probability s2 (1 --s2), entry is delayed, so the loss is just Z; and with probability (1--s) 2 both 
firms enter the first period, so the loss is S and with probability s2 (1 --s) 2 both firms enter the second 
period, and so the (present discounted value of the) loss is ~ S. 
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(23) This is, of course, only one of several reasons. For inStance, the prices and production norms that 
have been established by market processes prior to the emergency become increasingly out of tune 
with current situations, and systems of direct control often have difficulty adjusting them. 
(24) In this perspective, an explanation for the proclivity for centralized control in times of emergency 
is more likely to be found in Freudian psychology than in economic analysis. 
(25) Her results are consistent with the findings of other scholars. 
(26) Presumably, the organization could call for a meeting at time t, and penalize anyone who had not 
completed his assigned task. But this would impose a risk on the manager - -  since, if the penalty is 
large enough to affect his behaviour, it will mean that he will be punished only when it was, in fact, im- 
possible for him to acquire the information. 
(27) Certainly, the perspective provided by the Lange-Lerner-Taylor theorem, suggesting an equiva- 
lence between socialist and market economies, provides a dramatic example of how traditional ap- 
proaches can lead one far astray. 
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